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HISTORY FRIENDLY MODELS: 





Twenty years ago, we introduced the history friendly modelling approach to formally study 
industrial dynamics. In this paper we look retrospectively at the results that the history friendly 
literature has achieved so far and what are the challenges ahead of us. We illustrate the main 
principles, methods, and building blocks of the approach, and then we illustrate it through two 
applications. The first one investigates the impact of entry in the mainframes segment of the 
computer industry. The second application studies the effect of different industrial policies in 




Twenty years ago, some of us (Malerba et al., 1999) introduced a new modelling approach to 
formally study industrial dynamics. The approach was labelled “history-friendly modelling” and 
aimed at explaining specific patterns of evolution empirically observed in certain industries 
(Malerba et al., 2016). Our choice was motivated by the perception of current economic models 
about industry dynamics - even evolutionary models - as rather general and abstract, and far from 
the rich evidence emerging from empirical studies. Historical accounts and policy-oriented analyses 
of specific industries, in fact, suggested that the factors shaping industry evolution are diverse and 
quite different from one industry to another. The differences include a variety of elements, such as 
the nature of innovative opportunities, the formal and informal rules governing the appropriability 
of returns from innovation, the cumulativeness of technical change, the way firm behave 
confronting such environments, the link among sectors, the role of institutions. 
Still, history friendly models are evolutionary models: they therefore share the theoretical 
underpinnings of evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982). This is particularly relevant for 
the way agents, and especially business firms, are represented. Model firms are heterogeneous and 
quite complicated entities, that need to take decisions on many dimensions of interests, such as 
prices, R&D investments, technological trajectories,  domains to explore, marketing expenditures, 
products to develop, or the vertical scope of the firm. In all of these dimensions, firm choices are 
driven by decision rules that respond to available data on both the firm and its environment, and are 
“boundedly” rational (Simon, 1955; Cyert and March, 1963). These general features about how 
agents behave are also the result of the history of the company and the sector and are dependent by 
specific representations of the institutional, technological and market environment (e.g. the patent 
system, the presence and size of alternative markets, the role of actors such as the government, 
universities, venture capital and so on).  
In this paper we look retrospectively at the results that the history friendly literature has achieved so 
far and what are the challenges ahead of us. In the following section, we present the theoretical 
 
 
principles of the history friendly approach. Then, we illustrate in a comparative way the key 
ingredients of past models. Sections 4 and 5 report some original applications of existing models, 
that allow to highlight both the potential and the limits of the approach. Finally, we conclude by 
discussing future opportunities for research in the area. 
 
History Friendly Models: Principles and Methods 
Explaining the mechanisms behind the dynamics of a particular industry requires some elements of 
theory. Scholars studying the empirical patterns of industry evolution generally rely quite heavily 
on “appreciative” theories, as a tool to characterize the main mechanisms at work (Nelson et al., 
2018). 
Appreciative theories are typically verbal (rather than formal) theories, i.e. they are expressed 
through words (rather than formal symbols and equations); they have some elements of storytelling, 
and in general are more easily accessible to the general  reader. However, appreciative theories are 
causal theories: they include elements and arguments that analysts believe to play an effective role 
in driving the empirical phenomenon under study. Although appreciative theories are quite adherent 
to the empirical reality and offer convincing explanations of the observed patterns, they have a 
major structural limitation. In fact, it is quite difficult to verify the logical consistency of such 
theories, due to their complexity and the often lack of precision of the verbal language. History-
friendly models allow to overcome this major limit: they aim to capture and represent in formal 
terms the main mechanisms put forth by appreciative theories, in order to  explore their logical 
consistency through the power of formal methods (Malerba et al., 1999; 2016). 
To this purpose, building history friendly models requires three important steps. First, there is the 
selection of the phenomena deserving attention from a theoretical point of view. Economic history, 
and specifically the history and evolution of specific sectors, provides guidance in this step, together 
with informed evaluation by the scholars that want to undertake such an enterprise. In selecting the 
specific historical episodes and the industries to investigate, we have taken into account both their 
 
 
relevance in the industrial transformation of sectors and more generally for economic growth, and 
the role specific institutions, technological change and organizational knowledge.  
The second step is the choice of how to represent the selected phenomena. In this respect, history-
friendly models are fully evolutionary models, since they adopt the same basic representations used 
in evolutionary economic theory. The central actors are business firms that are heterogeneous and 
characterized by idiosyncratic capabilities. The focus is not only (and not much) on pricing and 
current production activities, but mostly on their innovative behaviour, which is seen as a key 
causal mechanism driving both firm performance and industry evolution. The external environment, 
in the form of demand conditions, technological change, and competition from rivals, also shapes 
their choices. A particular importance is also assigned to the time dimension: many features of the 
firms and the environment change over time, but there is no arbitrary assumption of equilibrium 
conditions prevailing at any period. However, history plays  guidance  also in this second step. 
Empirical studies of many industries show that elements specific to each individual history must be 
considered to provide explanations that are coherent with the mechanisms highlighted by 
appreciative theories. These elements may include institutional aspects (e.g. the patent system in the 
pharmaceutical industry), government decisions (e.g. the intense funding of R&D activities for 
military purposes in the early stage of the computer industry), the structure of the demand (e.g. the 
existence of preferences for different products or mixes of product characteristics), the dynamics of 
technical change (e.g. the introduction of new generations of semiconductor components in the 
computer industry), or firm strategic choices (e.g. the decision of IBM to develop the personal 
computer through an independent subsidiary).   
Finally, the third step is about manipulation and implementation of the model designed in the 
second step, to get meaningful results out of it. Here, history-friendly models are definitively part of 
the broad family of agent-based simulation models (Dawid, 2006). Agent-based models are 
simulation models dealing with the complexity of economic systems (Tesfatsion, 2002). They are 
characterized by the emergence of properties at the system level from the complex and non-linear 
 
 
interactions between boundedly-rational agents (Windrum et al., 2007). The use of computer 
simulations has become more widely accessible due to advances in information technology in 
recent years and is required to represent the large number of dimensions that are involved in the 
analysis and to translate heterogeneous agents and their complex interactions into workable models. 
History is useful also in this step. Typical agent-based  models have a large number of variables and 
parameters, and as many equations specifying interactions among them. Historical evidence about 
the industry helps to reduce the range of choices that the modeller otherwise has to do arbitrarily in 
absence of theory indications, as might be the case for the initial number of firms entering an 
industry or the relevant time span for the running of a simulation. Historical and theoretical 
considerations provide indications also on the variables to select to assess the results of the model. 
These variables do not play an active role in the functioning of the model, but are summary 
indicators of key trends: they must be properly defined and implemented in the programming code 
since the beginning. The analysis is typically conducted over mean values of these indicators, to 
reduce the impact of initial conditions and stochastic elements of the model. These values are 
obtained as averages from a large number of simulation runs, in which the value of the parameters 
is kept fixed. Still, it can be very useful also an analysis of individual runs of the model, as well as a 
sensitivity analysis, to evaluate the extent to which observed averages are a correct representation of 
simulated histories. Once the model is built, there is room for wider applications than just the 
replication of the observed patterns in the history of the industry. Indeed, a proper exploration of 
counter-factual simulations is needed to understand the relevance and coherence of causal 
mechanisms proposed by the underlying appreciative theories, although with the awareness of how 
tricky this can be, especially in the context of evolutionary economics (Cowan and Foray, 2002).  
 
History Friendly Models: Review and Building Blocks 
The first history-friendly model that we developed twenty years ago analyzed the long-term 
evolution of the computer industry, starting from its birth and the early growth of the mainframes 
 
 
segment to the introduction and growth of the personal computer segment (Malerba et al., 1999). 
Since then, a few works have applied the methodology to different industries. Malerba and 
Orsenigo (2002) and Garavaglia et al. (2013) analyzed the evolution of the pharmaceutical industry, 
focusing in particular on the era of random screening, and explored the effects of technologies with 
a low degree of cumulativeness and with markets that are strongly fragmented. The co-evolution of 
two industries (computers and semiconductors) is the focus of Malerba et al. (2008), with the 
explicit aim of highlighting the role of competences accumulation to explain the dynamics of firms 
vertical integration and specialisation between the two industries over different technological 
generations. These three models for computers, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors and 
computers are now also available in extended and revised version in Malerba et al. (2016), that also 
includes the simulation code to reproduce the results. Brenner and Murmann (2003, 2016) analyzed 
the German synthetic dye industry in the late decades of the nineteenth century until World War I, 
showing that the catching-up of German firms with respect to  France and British competitors and 
their sustained leadership in the following years was driven mostly by the strength and 
responsiveness of the national university system, rather than the existing stock of competences and 
the late introduction of the patent system in the country. Kim and Lee (2003) developed a model to 
study the evolution of the Random Access Memory chip industry (a relevant segment of 
semiconductors) in the 1970s and the 1980s, to explain the displacement of small specialised firms 
by larger diversified firms that entered at a later stage. The model proposes a combination of 
cumulativeness, process innovations, and large scale investments as main factors driving the 
observed patterns. More recent models include: (a) Malerba and Yoon (2011), on the recent 
emergence of a vertical structure in the semiconductor industry, with foundries pursuing chip 
manufacturing and fabless firms specialising on design, a dynamics associated to the increasing 
importance of application-specific knowledge; (b) Fontana and Zirulia (2015) on the local area 
networking (LAN) industry, a multi-market industry, in which the dominant firm in a segment 
(Cisco Systems in the router market) was able to extend its primacy to a new emerging segment (the 
 
 
switch market) through a strategy of combining the acquisition of the market pioneer and then 
leader and the exploitation of compatibility and switching costs; (c) Landini et al. (2017) on mobile 
phones and semiconductors, in which technological changes drives changes in industrial leadership 
across countries and firms; (d) Li et al. (2018) on the mobile communications industry in China 
from 2G to 4G, which highlights the interplay of segmented markets and generational technical 
changes as drivers of the long-term process of capabilities accumulation that allowed Chinese firms 
to catch-up with more advanced multinational competitors both in the domestic and the 
international market. 
Starting from the baseline models developed for specific industries, further applications have 
explored public policy issues. Malerba et al. (2001) discuss the challenges of antitrust policy 
dealing with the monopoly emerging in the computer industry and reinforced by the process of 
accumulation of technological capabilities and the tendency of customers lock-in, and highlight the 
role of the timing of the intervention as a key factor in determining its effectiveness. Malerba et al. 
(2008b) consider further policies rather than antitrust, and show how their effectiveness is again 
strongly influenced by customers lock-in and the arrival of technological discontinuities. Landini 
and Malerba (2017) study the role of different public policies, including support to entrepreneurship 
and protectionist measures, in the context of industrial catch-up. Beyond public policy, other 
general aspects have been investigated adapting existing models: the role of experimental users in 
the computer industry (Malerba et al., 2007); more nuanced contractual arrangements between 
computer industry firms (users) and semiconductor components-producers (Malerba and Orsenigo, 
2010), and the timing and intensity of entry (Garavaglia et al., 2006; Capone et al., 2013).  
All reported models are built around four main building blocks (see Garavaglia, 2010; Li et al., 
2018): demand; technological landscape; firm (innovative) behavior; industry dynamics. In the 





Demand plays a key role in most models, although sometimes is considered completely exogenous 
as in Kim and Lee (2002). In general, consumers are represented in a more stylized way that 
business firms. The typical functional form through which their preferences are expressed is the 
Cobb-Douglas function. All consumers prefer products with lower prices, or higher cheapness, and 
better quality, or merit of design (Malerba et al., 2016). However, the effect of quality and price on 
consumers purchasing decision needs not to be linear: consumers may consider a product only 
above (below) a certain threshold of quality (price), as in Malerba et al. (1999) and Garavaglia et al. 
(2013). Other factors affecting consumers are marketing or advertising expenditures by the firm 
(Malerba et al., 1999; Garavaglia et al., 2013), customers lock-ins (Malerba et al., 1999; Malerba et 
al., 2008; Brenner and Murmann, 2016) and switching costs (Capone et al., 2013; Fontana and 
Zirulia, 2015) 
Although customers are represented in a highly stylized way compared to other approaches, their 
preferences can be heterogeneous according to multiple aspects: the minimum/maximum thresholds 
of quality and price (Malerba et al., 2016; Li et al., 2018), the trade-off between quality and price 
(Malerba et al., 1999; 2008), or the extent to which they can buy also products distant from their 
favourite one (Capone et al., 2013; Fontana and Zirulia, 2015; Brenner and Murmann, 2016). 
 Technological change 
There is considerably more heterogeneity in the way innovation landscapes are modelled. In some 
models firms are assumed to improve their current product along a specified trajectory, due to the 
cumulativeness of technical change (Malerba et al., 1999; 2008; Li et al., 2018), while in others the 
quality of a product cannot be changed and innovation is about productivity or the introduction of 
new products (Kim and Lee, 2002; Garavaglia et al., 2013). Some models explicitly represent the 
patent system (Garavaglia et al., 2013; Brenner and Murman, 2016). New technologies may arrive 
over time and displace older ones (Malerba et al., 2008) or just coexist with them (Malerba et al., 
1999; Fontana and Zirulia, 2015; Li et al., 2018). 
 Firm innovative behaviour  
 
 
Firms innovative activities are strongly intertwined with the technological landscape. In general, 
these activities are subject to stochastic elements, but are also determined by investment decisions, 
that is by the amount of resources that firms take from their initial funding (Malerba et al., 1999; 
Garavaglia et al., 2013) or current profits (Malerba et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008). In some models 
firms are also allowed to imitate their competitors (Kim and Lee, 2002; Garavaglia et al., 2013; 
Brenner and Murmann, 2016).  
 Industrial dynamics 
Finally, industrial dynamics refers to the processes governing the entry and exit of firms. Some of the 
models allow entry at specified periods of time, that is at the beginning of the history or when new 
technologies arrive (Malerba et al., 1999; 20008). In other cases, entry is endogenous to the model 
and depends on other variables, such as the level of innovative opportunities (Garavaglia et al., 2013), 
the  stock of potential founders (Brenner and Murmann, 2016), long-term expected profits (Kim and 
Lee, 2002), or the exit of firms (Li et al., 2018). Exit is typically driven by poor performance either 
in terms of profits (Malerba et al., 1999; Li et al., 2018) or market shares (Malerba et al., 2008; 
Garavaglia et al., 2013; Brenner and Murmann, 2016). Fontana and Zirulia (2015) consider also the 
possibility of mergers and acquisitions. 
 
Applications: Entry in the Computer Industry 
In this section we briefly present an original application of the Malerba et al. (1999) model to 
explore the theme of entry and survival1. That paper presented a history-friendly model of the 
evolution of the computer industry, addressing a peculiar challenge raised by its historical 
development. A dominant firm (IBM) emerged very early and managed to keep the leadership of 
the market, although experiencing strong competence-destroying technological change, but it was 
                                                          
1 For reasons of space we do not report here a full descritpion of the model. 
 
 
not able to contrast the entry of new, small and innovative firms in the new market segment that 
emerged as a result of the technical change. 
The model depicts an industry where at the beginning a single component technology is available 
(the “transistor”) and later on a new component technology (the “microprocessor”) emerges. The 
two technologies differ along two dimensions, performance and cheapness, and the microprocessor 
has an objectively higher technology potential on both of them. These two dimensions provide 
value for customers: all users prefer faster and less expensive computers, but they differ in the 
relative importance they give to them. Big firms prefer mainframes because they assign more 
importance to performance; small users are much more interested in cheapness and therefore prefer 
personal computers. The two groups of customers also differ in the minimum requirements that a 
computer must satisfy in both dimensions in order to consider it for purchasing. The transistor 
technology does not meet the cheapness minimum requirements of the small users. Therefore, this 
market segment emerges only once the microprocessor technology becomes available.  
Within each component technology, there is high cumulativeness of technical change: firms 
improve both the attributes of their product by investing in R&D laboratories and by learning from 
experience. Each firm has a specific and invariant technological trajectory that determines the 
relative weight assigned to improvements in performance vis-à-vis cheapness. 
The dynamics of the model is as follows. At the beginning, a number of firms starts R&D spending 
to explore technological trajectories based on the transistor technology; once they meet the 
minimum requirements by mainframes customers, they start selling products and use their profits to 
push technological improvements. Then, the microprocessor technology enters the stage and new 
firms start their R&D spending using it to target either the mainframes segment or the personal 
computer segment, although in the former they face competition from incumbents. Finally, also 
incumbents can adopt the new technology and enter the personal computers segment. 
The number of firms that attempted entry at the early stage of the industry was very low, and most 
of them came from already mature industries such as punched-card machines and electronics. This 
 
 
is reflected in the model, where the number of firms (N) that try to enter the industry by exploiting 
the initial “transistor” technology is fixed at a low level (6). 
In this exercise, entry will still be considered as an exogenous process. However, we introduce the 
relevant distinction between potential entrants and actual entrants. Potential entrants are those firms 
that start their R&D activities in an industry: only some of them become actual entrants, and the 
period between potential entry and actual entry is endogenous to the model. This distinction points 
to a more general point. Standard theories of entry typically posit the existence of a pool or queue of 
potential entrants, the origin of which is unspecified and the size of which is assumed to be infinite 
or again is unspecified (with the notable exception of the flourishing literature on the role of pre-
entry experience and spinoffs pioneered by Klepper, 2002). Potential entrants then decide to enter 
evaluating the prospects for profitability. However, the size of this queue might be crucial for 
determining the actual amount of entry. If the queue is small, entry will be limited irrespective of 
any other condition. When the pool is very large, “excessive entry” might take place, as soon as 
heterogeneity among firms, imperfect information, or uncertainty are considered. Thus, an effort 
towards beginning to disentangle the role played by the size of the queue and “real” entry might be 
a worthwhile undertaking. 
So, our initial question is whether the presence of a limited number of potential entrants at the early 
stage of the computer industry was a key determinant of its following structure and dynamics. In 
principle we would expect no big change, as the effects of the cumulativeness of technical change, 
the existence of a homogenous demand and the presence of lock-ins for the customers in the 
mainframe market should not depend on the number of competing firms. 
The experiment is run as follows: we study the evolution of the industry for all the values of N from 
6 (baseline value) up to 100. Moreover, for each value of N we generate a set of 100 simulations in 
order to reduce the impact of random elements. Figure 1 shows the effects of these changes on the 




INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
 In any given period, as N increases the Herfindahl index decreases; however, as the initial number 
of firms is made larger, the fall in concentration in the mainframe segment associated with the entry 
of the new microprocessor firms becomes smaller. Last, the Herfindahl index has a steep increase 
towards the end of the simulation even when N takes its maximum value (100). These results are 
not surprising: the existence of more potential entrants reduces concentration, but at a decreasing 
rate. And  as the three key determinants of industry structure in this sectoral context 
(cumulativeness, demand homogeneity, lock-ins) are at work, a dominant firm emerges in all cases. 
Therefore potential entrants have only a short-run impact on market structure. 
While the initial number of firms does not affect much concentration, it does have an influence on 
who becomes the dominant firm. Figure 2 shows that the share of the first generation firms (those 
entering with the “transistor” technology) in the mainframe segment decreases abruptly when the 
number of entrants is quite high, leaving room for the newcomers based on the “microprocessor” 
technology.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
To dig deeper in this result, we then apply statistical methods to the simulation results by 
considering each simulation as an observation and building a binary variable that takes the value 
“1” if the share of the first generation firms in the mainframes segment in the last period is higher 
than 80% and the value “0” if the share is lower than 20%. Therefore we drop a small number of 
observations where the share is between 20% and 80% and all simulations in which either no first 
generation firm or no second generation firm manage to enter the market. The final number of 




INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Model 1 in Table 1 presents the baseline model having the market success of first generation firms 
as dependent variable and using only a constant term as a regressor. In Model 2 we include also N 
(the number of first generation potential entrants). Results are striking: the new model provides only 
a limited improvement on the baseline, as it can explain only 29% of the cases that were not 
correctly predicted by Model 1; moreover, the marginal effect associated to N is very low. In sum, 
while the initial number of firms does not affect much concentration, it would seem to favour the 
performance of second generation firms. Yet, regression results do not appear to support this 
conclusion. The issue deserves clearly some further investigation.  
Therefore, in addition to the number of entrants, we consider now four more variables that might 
help to explain the success of incumbents vis-à-vis newcomers. They are:  
1. the level of concentration in the industry, as measured by the Herfindahl Index (HERF); 
2. the distance of the leader firm from the technological frontier (FRONTIER); 
3. the distance of the leader firm from the best technological trajectory  (TRAJECTORY); 
4. the distance of the leader firm from the technological trajectory of its next follower 
(FOLLOWER).  
The intuition is simple. Lower concentration implies that the rise to dominance of any one firm is 
slower and in any case the leader faces tougher competition. Similarly, the existence of a close 
follower weakens the position of the dominant firm vis-à-vis new competitors. Hence, later entrants 
introducing the new technology may find it easier to challenge the incumbent(s). This will also be 
the case if the leader is still far away from the technological frontier at the time of the discontinuity: 
the gap faced by the new entrants is smaller.  Last, if the dominant firm happens to follow a 




For each of these variables, we consider the distinction between “potential” entrants and “actual” 
entrants.  When the  “microprocessor” technology emerges, a number of  potential entrants 
(POTENTIAL or P) start their R&D activity along the new trajectories opened by this new 
technology. This variable indicates the time of entry and it is exogenously determined by a 
parameter of the model. Actual entry (ACTUAL or A) occurs instead when a new potential entrant 
starts selling its product in the mainframe segment: this time variable is endogenously determined 
within the model and therefore it does change across simulations.   
To begin with, we observe that the results indicate that actual entry (A, Model 4) performs better 
than potential entry (P, Model 3) in predicting the outcomes of the industry. However, potential 
entry does matter: the full model (Model 5), in which the relevant variables measured at both 
periods P and E are taken into account, still adds something to the picture. 
Second, results clearly indicate that newcomers have more possibilities to displace the incumbents 
if at the time they start their R&D operations and, more importantly, at the time they start selling 
their product on the mainframes segment:  
1. there is lower concentration in the industry (positive sign of HERF);  
2. the incumbent is far from the technological frontier (positive sign of FRONTIER); 
3. the incumbent follows a technological trajectory which is not perfectly addressed to the 
needs of demand  (negative sign of TRAJECTORY); 
4. the incumbent has a close competitor within the firms that belong to the first generation 
(positive sign of FOLLOWER). 
Thus, the statistical analysis confirm the intuitions. It is worth noting that the independent variables 
pertain to different domains: the competitive structure of industry (HERF), the competitive 
dynamics among incumbents (FOLLOWER), the position in the technological environment 
(FRONTIER) and the position in the demand environment (TRAJECTORY).  
This analysis helps also to explain the puzzling results obtained in the previous section. We 
observed  a positive relation between N (the number of first generation potential entrants) and the 
 
 
emergence of a leader among the second generation firms, but this finding was not supported by 
regression results. The explanation is that in fact at least three of the variables of the previous 
analysis are affected by N: concentration (HERF)  has a negative relationship with the number of 
firms in an industry; there is a higher probability that a strong competitor emerges (FOLLOWER) if 
the pool on which it can be selected is larger; finally, tougher competition among many firms slows 
down and limits the growth of a leading firm (FRONTIER). Even more interestingly, once we take 
into account these variables the effect of N switches from negative to positive. First, quite simply, 
since the size of the pool of early entrants is larger, the chances that a first generation firm becomes 
the leader increase correspondingly. Second, new entrants face more competition from incumbents 
at the time of their entry: the current leader might be weaker, but there is more diffuse competition.  
One final remark regards the trajectories followed by successful new entrants. Are they 
systematically different from those “chosen” by previous leaders?  We test whether the mean of the 
trajectories of leader firms significantly differ according to their generation (Table 2). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
First generation leaders are likely to have a trajectory that leads as quickly as possible to the market, 
in order to lock-in customers, gain profits to increase R&D expenses and therefore sustain  further 
technological advances. This is the trajectory that mirrors the consumer preferences of users of 
mainframes before the discontinuity and it is identified by the position of the minimum thresholds 
of  performance and cheapness. Is this technological “strategy” still successful for the second 
generation firms? It should not, because the new microprocessor-based firms cannot exploit the 
early-mover advantage of first generation firms. In fact, the test gives a negative answer. The 
technological trajectory that characterizes the new second generation leaders is quite different and it 




Applications: Exploration of unknown opportunities 
The second application focuses on an extreme scenario where firms explore an unknown space of 
opportunities. The model used to carry on the following exercises is based on the history-friendly 
representation of the pharmaceutical industry developed by Malerba and Orsenigo (2002), 
Garavaglia et al. (2013), and Malerba et al. (2016). The model depicts an industry characterized by 
market fragmentation, an innovative process in presence of low cumulativeness, and a competitive 
context where imitation plays an important role. However, the model representation might also 
apply to many cases where firms operate under deep uncertainty about the properties of the 
environment, be it an industry, a region, a country; very much in the spirit of Rodrik (2004). 
Here is a brief sketch of the model. A number of firms compete to discover, develop and market 
new products to satisfy a large variety of consumers’ needs. They face a space of opportunities that, 
at the beginning, is largely unexplored. R&D activity is split in two stages: research, i.e. the attempt 
to discover promising product designs; and development, when these potential products are 
transformed into actual market products. In the first stage, firms randomly explore the space of 
products: only a very limited number of product designs has the potential to become an actual 
product, while the others have “zero quality”. There is little scientific knowledge guiding search, 
and success is a random event. When a firm finds a design that might become a marketable  
product, the firm patents it. The patent provides protection from imitation for a certain amount of 
time and over a range of similar designs.  
Once a promising design has been found, a firm engages in its development, which requires time 
and resources. The firm does not know how difficult, time consuming and costly the process will 
be, or what the actual quality of the new product will be. Development projects sometimes just fail.  
When development is completed, the firm uses these resources to launch the product in the 
marketplace. Sales are influenced by the quality of the product, but also by the marketing efforts 
and by the price that is charged. Pricing is based on a mark-up rule that takes into account the 
competitive pressure in the submarket. 
 
 
Firms are represented as strategically heterogeneous, displaying differing propensities towards 
innovation on the one hand,  and towards imitation and marketing on the other. The first successful 
product offered to satisfy a particular need faces no competition, and the firm may experience a 
burst of growth. But after some time, other firms may discover and develop competitive products. 
Moreover, after patent expiration, imitation may occur. As a consequence of the competition from 
competing or imitative products, the market share and revenue of the original innovator will be 
eroded away by competitors and imitators. 
A key concept in the model is that of a submarket. The term is meant to represent a group of 
customers that are related in the sense that they share similar or related needs, that can be satisfied 
by similar or related products. In the model, submarkets are anonymous as well as abstract: they do 
not have names that correspond to real world analogues. The discovery of a product in a particular 
submarket does not increase the probability that a firm can discover another product in the same 
submarket or in a different one, given the firm’s innovative effort. However, as it discovers and 
develops new products, a firm will progressively diversify into new submarkets. Thus, 
diversification into new submarkets is treated as a random process: firms are always searching 
everywhere in the space of products. A firm’s growth will then depend on the number of products 
discovered and commercialized, the size and the growth of the submarkets they are present in, the 
number of competitors and the relative quality and price of the products. 
If it has the resources, a firm can choose to invest simultaneously in several parallel projects of 
research for developing different product it has discovered. If some project needs to be postponed 
because of lack of resources, the choice of which project to develop depends on the economic value 
of the submarket and the residual length of patent protection. Initially, firms are endowed with 
external seed resources to conduct their early research and development activities. Once the 
discovered products are commercialized, profits coming from the sales of products are reinvested in 
R&D and marketing. As time passes in the simulated history, there is a broad tendency to 
diminishing returns to R&D that is attributable to the fact that the space of untapped opportunities is 
 
 
getting depleted by the ongoing discovery process – but the complex details of this evolution are 
determined endogenously.  
In the context of this model, a good metric of social welfare is represented by the number of new 
submarkets discovered through the innovation process. In fact, until the first product within a 
submarket is discovered, all consumers within the submarket cannot satisfy their needs. A second 
metric is represented by firms’ profits (the producer surplus): high profits are also positive from a 
welfare point of view because in the model we assume that a fraction of it is invested in R&D 
activities. However, high profits are also an indicator of concentration, which can be harmful for 
social welfare. Therefore, for each exercise we conduct, we also consider the dynamics of 
concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index. 
Benchmark case. The relevance of policy actions depends much on how difficult is for economic 
agents to operate within the context set by the market forces and the technological environment. If 
the environment is munificent in terms of innovation opportunities, policy might well become 
irrelevant. Therefore, as a benchmark for our analysis we use a context in which innovation is quite 
difficult because of both costs and uncertainty. Figure 3 shows the results of the benchmark case: in 
Panel A, after an initial period of search, submarkets start to be discovered by firms. Their number 
increases quite quickly at the beginning, but then the growth rate slows down. The rapid growth at 
the beginning is due to the entry of many new innovative firms in a relatively short period. Later, 
the discovery process becomes slower also because innovative firms face the competition by 
imitators,  that reduces their profits. This can also be seen by looking at Panel B: the average firm 
profit increases steadily at the beginning, and then declines once the entry of imitators reduces 
margins. Towards the end, profits start increasing again, as an effect of a selection process across 
firms. Finally, the Herfindahl Index (depicted in Panel C) starts growing steadily quite soon and 
reaches a relatively high level. 
Watering-Can Policy. In this context, the simplest incentive policy that can be designed is just to 
give money to all firms, according to the watering-can principle. All firms receive an incentive in 
 
 
the form of an amount of money, that must be spent in innovation activities. In the early phase, this 
money is calibrated to double the level of private investment of the firms. Later, once firms start 
gaining profits, the incentive is financed by a 20% tax on profits, but this amount is again doubled 
by the government. This way, in the second phase there is also a shift of resources from imitative to 
innovative firms. Results are showed in Figure 4 and are quite striking. The number of discovered 
submarkets (Panel A) shows a steeper growth in the early phase, and by the end of the simulation it 
reaches a value 60% higher than in the benchmark case. This is also possible because in the early 
phase, firms get much higher profits, that allow them to finance further innovation activities and to 
discover more submarkets (Panel B). However, the increase in profits is only temporary: by the end 
of the simulation, the level of profits is lower than in the benchmark case. This is due to the fact that 
over all the simulation, the concentration is always much lower than in the benchmark case (Panel 
C). So, the results of this policy is that we get more innovation, but we also end up in a quite 
competitive environment. 
Timing effects of Watering-Can Policy. A natural follow-up question is whether the timing of the 
incentives matters. Therefore, we run two more simulations in which this incentive scheme applies 
either only in the early phase (early life cycle, or ELC) or only in the late phase (late life cycle, or 
LLC). Results are showed in Figure 5: it is quite evident that this type of incentives is particularly 
effective in the early phase because they allow more firms to discover more submarkets at the 
beginning and to use the resulting profits to finance further innovation activities, without harming, 
but actually sustaining competition. When incentives are given too late, when the growing and 
exploratory phase of the industry life cycle is already exhausted, we do not observe significant 
differences with respect to the benchmark case with no incentives. 
Merit-Based Incentives. Rather than simply distribute money to all firms, the policymaker might 
choose to select only some of the firms as recipients of the incentives. We model this policy 
alternative by changing the probability distribution of innovation activities letting the chances to 
innovate depend on past innovative performance as measured by the number of discovered 
 
 
innovative products. Therefore, best performing firms in terms of innovation outcomes (discovered 
and commercialized product designs) will get a higher probability to discover new products, 
analogously to what would happen if they would receive a monetary subsidy . Results of this 
exercise are presented in Figure 6, and are compared to the Benchmark and Watering-Can cases. 
The new policy generates only a limited increase in the number of discovered submarkets (around 
10%), and the additional discoveries occur quite late in the life cycle of the industry. This pattern is 
also associated to a relevant increase in both firms profits and concentration. Overall, the Merit-
Based policy performs worse than the simple Watering-Can policy: the main reason is that a Merit-
Based policy cannot be properly applied when the industry is young, because it is more difficult to 
recognize which are the best firms in this period. However, as it was clear from the Timing 
experiment, the early phase is also the one in which incentives are more important. 
Ex-Ante Selection. An even more sophisticated policy might consider the possibility to identify and 
select the most promising areas for research and to concentrate in those areas the extra-resources 
provided by the policymaker. We model this exercise by shifting the distribution of search efforts 
from a Uniform density function to a Pareto-like density function, where the submarkets with the 
highest probability to be explored are those with the highest number of customers. Because of this 
change, the probability of selection of a product design satisfying the needs of a particular 
submarket is not equal for all product designs. So, this policy indirectly operates like a subsidy 
given to firms for conducting specific research activities. This way, we partially relax the extreme 
uncertainty assumption and we consider that a high number of customers can be more easily 
recognised and therefore become the indirect target of a policy, or might even act directly to lobby 
the policymaker. Results are shown in Figure 7. This policy produces higher profits than the 
benchmark in the growing stage of the life cycle (Panel B), but they are not used to explore more 
submarkets as in the Watering-Can case. In fact, Panel A shows that the number of discovered 
submarkets is 15% lower than the benchmark case, and is less than half the number of discovered 
 
 
submarkets in the Watering-Can exercise. Moreover, there is also no benefit in terms of 
concentration, which remains stable around the same levels of the benchmark case (Panel C). 
The reason behind these results is that the incentive scheme induces firms to concentrate only on a 
limited set of submarkets. Many areas are subject to a limited innovative effort, whereas the most 
popular submarkets are subject to strong selection forces that reduce the number of surviving firms 
and therefore increase concentration. 
Timing effects of Ex-Ante Selection Policy. It is interesting to explore a follow-up exercise changing 
the timing of the incentive scheme, analogously to what we did in the Watering-Can case. Again, 
we run two more simulations in which the Ex-Ante Selection (EAS) incentive scheme applies either 
only in the early phase (EAS_ELC) or only in the late phase (EAS_LLC). The basic expectation is 
that an application of the scheme only in the early phase might improve the outcomes: early 
selection might help firms to focus on the right areas, and then later on they can use profits to 
explore more submarkets. The late life cycle scheme, instead, would be less effective in that it does 
not affect much the behaviour of the firms in the growing stage of the industry life cycle. Results 
are shown in Figure 8. Limiting the incentive to the early life cycle has a positive effect as 
compared to the full time scheme, since the number of discovered submarkets increases in the later 
stages of the simulation. However, this is not enough to match the outcomes of the benchmark case. 
Firms do not get enough profits from the most populated submarkets, due to the strong competition 
that occurs in these selected submarkets. As expected the late life cycle policy has a limited effect 
on the number of discovered submarkets, but it also has a positive effect on concentration: the 
Herfindahl index increases to levels higher than the Benchmark case due to the indirect protection 
that is ensured to monopolists or oligopolists in the less explored submarkets. 
Imperfect Ex-Ante Selection. An important variant of the Ex-Ante Selection policy would require 
that the policymaker has not perfect information about the submarkets characteristics, and therefore 
it might actually select the wrong ones – maybe because groups taking advantage by the 
development of some submarkets are better able to exercise pressure or gain visibility, or simply 
 
 
because we are back in the extreme uncertainty scenario, but the policymarker is not aware of it. 
Results presented in Figure 9 show that the outcomes become worse in this situation: since the 
amount of profits available to firms decreases, the number of discovered submarkets is lower than 
in the perfect information case. Concentration, however, remains stable at lower levels, because 
lower profits reduce the possibility for the best firms to discover new products and drive out of the 
market laggard firms. 
Few Submarkets. The analysis conducted so far refers to an industry characterized by a high number 
(200) of independent submarkets. An interesting question to ask is whether results would differ by 
changing this aspect of the environmental context. In this exercise, we reduce the number of 
submarkets to 1/10 of the original value (20), keeping constant the total number of potential 
products to be discovered and the global size of the industry. In this modified context, we compare 
the results of the Benchmark case with the Watering-Can policy and the Ex-Ante Selection policy, 
as defined in the previous sections. Since the number of submarkets is much lower, we also 
consider a different metric to evaluate results: the number of discovered (innovative) products. 
Results are presented in Figure 10. Although in the Ex-Ante Selection the dynamics of discovery is 
slower, in all three cases all submarkets are discovered in the early phase of the industry (Panel A). 
In terms of products discovered, the best performance is guaranteed by the Ex-Ante Selection:  in 
this case the higher profits earned by firms (Panel B) determine higher investment opportunities that 
can be translated in the discovery of new products, since there are no neglected submarkets. 
Analogously to what found in the previous cases, the Ex-Ante Selection policy determines a higher 
level of concentration (Panel C). 
 
Conclusions 
The two cases reported in the previous sections provide interesting insights about the potential of 
history-friendly models to go beyond the simple task of replicating historical occurrences and 
providing counterfactual analyses. The application on entry in the computer industry shows that 
 
 
even in a context where cumulativeness and lock-ins made monopoly the only possible outcome, 
entry can have long-lasting consequences for the selection of the winner firm and technology. 
Although this might be less interesting for industrial economists, it is a question that could be 
central in the analysis of strategy scholars interested in the sources of superior performance of 
dominant firms and also of researchers investigating catching-up by latecomer firms and 
technologies. Similarly, the application of innovation policies in the model of the pharmaceutical 
industry generates insightful reflections on how such policies should take into account the role of 
uncertainty and the nature of the innovation problem at stake. 
On a more general level, history-friendly models today still offer many research opportunities, as 
large historical datasets become available, complexity is more and more recognized as the real 
challenge to understand economic phenomena, and new insights about how heterogeneous firms 
and people within them take decisions. A first and obvious opportunity is to enlarge the set of 
industries analyzed through this method. These may include other industries in which formal R&D 
plays an important role, such as the aircraft industry or the medical devices industry. However, the 
work might be extended to more traditional sectors, such as textiles or steel, to study specific 
historical episodes where major changes occurred in the technologies used. Even more relevant, due 
to the current trend in economic activities, would be the extension of history friendly models to 
services, that would require major changes (see Pereira and Dequech, 2015, for a first attempt). 
Further advancements might come from comparative modelling of different industries on a specific 
theme (a recent example about spinoffs is the work by Capone et al., 2019) or rather of the same 
industry across different countries, as in the historical account by Mowery and Nelson (1999). 
History-friendly models could also provide insights into complex questions related to specific 
themes. The role of spinoffs in the evolution of industries (Klepper, 2016) might be one of such 
themes. There is now overwhelming evidence about the important advantages that experienced 
founders inherit from their parents, but there is still debate on what kind of experience could be 
more beneficial, and what impact can have on all actors of the industry. The dynamics of industrial 
 
 
catching up by developing countries (Malerba and Nelson, 2012;  Lee 2013) might be another one. 
On this topic, actually, there has been some recent attempt at modelling what happened in specific 
industries like global mobile phones and semiconductors (Landini et al., 2017; Landini and 
Malerba, 2017), and mobile communications in China (Li et al., 2018). A third theme is the role 
country and industry specific institutions. Empirically, the role of institutions has been examined in 
detail for several industries by the literature on sectoral systems (Malerba, 2002; Malerba and 
Adams, 2014), but also for the evolution of industrial structures in countries and regions (Boschma 
and Capone, 2015; Cortinovis et al., 2017). The institutional economics literature can offer relevant 
case studies and appreciative theories to inform history-friendly models aimed at explaining the role 
of institutions in industry evolution (Grabner, 2016). Finally, history-friendly models could also be 
enriched by a deeper consideration of the strategic behavior by different types of firms, that so far 
has been represented through simple and inertial decision rules. The approach might benefit from 
integration, at least to some extent, of recent approaches considering the complexity  of relations 
within a firm (e.g. the NK model introduced by Levinthal, 1997), or power and knowledge 
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Figure 1. Herfindahl Index in the mainframes segment over time as a function of N. 
 
 
Figure 2. Share of first generation firms in the mainframes segment over time as a function of N. 
 
 
Figure 3. Benchmark case 
        
 
Figure 4. Watering-Can Policy 
         
 
Figure 5. Timing of Watering-Can Policy 
         
 
Figure 6. Merit-Based Policy 
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Figure 7. Ex-Ante Selection Policy 
         
 
Figure 8. Timing of Ex-Ante Selection Policy 
         
 
Figure 9. Ex-Ante Imperfect Selection Policy 
         
 
Figure 10. Few Submarkets 
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Table 1. Probability that the mainframes market winner is a first generation firm. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 0.2129*** 0.7008*** -1.7231*** -1.33*** -1.3699*** 
N  -0.0089*** -0.0039*** 0.0021*** 0.0013*** 
HERF(P)   1.4781***  0.3454*** 
FRONTIER(P)   3.4417***  0.6235*** 
TRAJECTORYP   -0.7423***  -0.2165*** 
FOLLOWER(P)   0.1363***  0.037**v 
HERF(A)    1.6013*** 1.2589*** 
FRONTIER(A)    1.3093*** 0.9972*** 
TRAJECTORYA    -0.6963*** -0.4419*** 
FOLLOWER(A)    0.26*** 0.1032*** 
      
% Correctly Predicted Cases 74.7 82.1 93.5 96.2 96.5 
Errors 22924 16285 5898 3467 3183 
% Correctly Predicted – Adj - 29.0 74.3 84.9 86.1 
McFadden R2 - 0.365347 0.717132 0.829435 0.844550 
BIC 102607.3 65135.65 29089.56 17567.80 16062.69 




Table 2. Difference in the technological trajectories of the 
mainframes  market winner: first versus second generation. 
 First Generation Second Generation 
Mean 0.822071 0.8754 
S.D. 0.0133 0.0474 
H0 (FG = SG) Rejected; p(0.0001); t(-168.01). 
 
